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My early attempts at teaching students summary judgment taught me how 
complex the topic is. I remember trying to convey the deceptively simple 
task of deciding whether material facts were in genuine dispute. It was hard 
enough for students to maneuver procedural standards in the suddenly fact-
intensive, post-discovery environment. In the ontology of legal process, 
facts are at once ordinary and mystical, concrete and fluid, everywhere and 
nowhere. Once embedded in a lawsuit, facts are both overdetermined and 
undercontextualized, flattened and shorn of their social meaning. But in 
addition, summary judgment demands that facts be curated; they have to 
be material to a claim. Materiality is a concept that, with the injection of 
substantive law into the analysis, often confounds the first-year student. In 
helping my students navigate the rich landscape of facts, I found it especially 
difficult to get the students to appreciate how judges confronted a somewhat 
contradictory task: to ask if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving 
party and yet not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing the evidence.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) sets out the standard for granting 
motions for summary judgment, requiring courts to take cases away from 
juries and enter judgment as a matter of law when “there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact.”1 Because disputes over facts are the unique province 
of the jury, another way to frame the question of whether there is a genuine 
factual dispute is to ask if a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving 
party given the material in the record.2 If so, the case should not be disposed 
of by the judge. For an issue to be genuine, the nonmoving party has to show 
facts that put that issue in dispute, and the judge has to assess the proof.3 
That judicial assessment is necessary because a genuine dispute is one that 
is worthy of a jury; the modern standard requires that to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there 
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”4 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has held that assessing the record on summary judgment “necessarily 
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
2. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
3. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
4. Id. at 586.
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implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at 
the trial on the merits.”5 In other words, at summary judgment, a judge must 
assess the evidence in light of the standard of proof and from the perspective 
of a rational jury but must not usurp the role of the jury by weighing the 
evidence.6 Applying this Zen koan is quite a bit to ask of a federal judge and 
can be positively mind-bending for first-year students.
Disputes of Fact
To unravel the riddle of summary judgment, I often pose the most basic of 
hypotheticals about a dispute over whether the traffic light was red or green 
when the defendant went through it, causing an accident. The plaintiff’s theory 
is that defendant was negligent in running a red light.7 The hypothetical poses 
different kinds and degrees of factual evidence for each side to test the easy cases 
of clear factual disputes, the easy cases of no factual disputes, and the difficult 
cases of significantly unequal evidence. For example, I ask students how the 
judge should rule on a motion for summary judgment by the defendant if 
the defendant, in support of his motion, submits affidavits from ten witnesses 
who say the light for defendant was green, and the plaintiff, in opposing the 
motion, submits her own affidavit stating that she observed the light and it was 
red. This is a hard question for students; viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and through the lens of the burden of proof, 
the plaintiff’s affidavit surely does more than a raise a metaphysical doubt. Yet, 
putting aside the credibility of the witnesses, which is clearly the job of a jury, 
could a reasonable jury find for the plaintiff?
As the students are struggling with that last question, I offer them an 
alternative. They can ignore the confounding phantasm of the ten hypothetical 
witnesses for the defendant. What if the defendant supports his motion for 
summary judgment with a single video that suggests that his light was green, 
and the plaintiff responds with her own affidavit again that she observed the 
defendant’s light to be red. Relief spreads through the class. A video changes 
everything. They overwhelmingly conclude that the judge should grant 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. No rational jury could find for 
the plaintiff in the face of evidence so compelling and infallible as a video.
Sometimes there is a lone dissenter, or a smattering of skeptics. Sometimes 
not. Digital experts though they are, my students tend to be visually 
guileless. Their first assumption is that a video is more conclusive than other 
demonstrative or documentary evidence and certainly more reliable than 
testimonial evidence. Their reactions suggest that the videos that circulate on 
the Internet, uploaded from cell phones or police body cameras, are a new kind 
5. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
6. Id. at 249.
7. This hypothetical initially came from the Freer & Perdue civil procedure casebook, RiChaRd 
d. FReeR & Wendy Collins PeRdue, Civil PRoCeduRe: Cases, MateRials, and Questions 
485 (5th ed. 2008), but I tweak it a little each year.
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of evidence, perhaps “experiential” evidence in that the images allow them 
to experience the event.8 They are fairly confident that summary judgment 
would be appropriate in the face of a factual dispute in which one side has 
experiential evidence and the other side does not. So I ask them questions 
that I hope will lead them to reassess their confidence in the imagined images 
on the defendant’s video. I ask them what it means for a video “to suggest” 
the light was green. What do they imagine the video showed? What kinds 
of images would be most compelling? What kinds of images would speak to 
material facts? Do they need additional information about the video to assess 
its reliability? Can they assess its reliability without weighing the evidence? A 
few change their minds, but it’s a hypothetical about a hypothetical video. It 
is far too abstract, and they imagine anything they want.
So I show them a real video. It is the video from the Supreme Court’s case 
of Scott v. Harris.9 But before they know anything about that video, I give the 
students the following exercise developed from the case.
An Exercise
At 10:42 p.m. on March 29, 2001, Deputy Sheriff Clinton Reynolds was 
stationed on Georgia Highway 34 when he clocked a vehicle traveling at 
seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone. Although 
Reynolds flashed his blue lights, the driver refused to slow down and continued 
driving. Reynolds made a decision to pursue the driver.
Through his radio, Reynolds learned that the car was registered to Victor 
Harris, and it was not stolen. It is undisputed that Harris, who was also the 
driver, had registered the car at his own address. Reynolds did not report that 
he was pursuing the vehicle because the driver had been speeding.
Reynolds followed Harris, using his flashing lights in an attempt to get 
Harris to pull over. When Harris did not stop, Reynolds turned on his lights 
and siren, which activated his video camera. Harris not only refused to stop 
but sped up, beginning a high-speed chase. According to Harris, whose 
testimony was not disputed, he didn’t stop because he was scared, wanted to 
get home, and was hoping to avoid an impound fee for his car. Harris admits 
that during the course of the pursuit, he drove well in excess of the speed 
limits, passed vehicles on a double yellow line, and ran a green light. Despite 
these traffic violations, Harris used his turn signals when passing or turning, 
maintained control of his car, and slowed before passing cars in his lane to 
check for oncoming traffic.
Officer Timothy Scott, who had heard Reynolds’ radio communication, 
decided to join the pursuit. At one point, Harris slowed, signaled, and turned 
into the parking lot of a shopping complex. There were no pedestrians or other 
vehicles in the parking lot. Reynolds followed Harris, and Scott proceeded to 
8. Jessica Silbey calls this “evidence verité.” Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches 
to Filmic Evidence, 37 u. MiCh. J.l. ReFoRM 493 (2004). 
9. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
77
the opposite side of the complex in an attempt to cut Harris off. As Harris 
attempted to exit the parking lot and Scott attempted to hem him in, the two 
vehicles came into contact, causing minor damage to Scott’s cruiser. Harris re-
entered Highway 34 and continued to flee. The police blocked all intersections 
ahead of Harris so that no traffic would cross the highway as Scott, now the 
lead police vehicle, pursued Harris.
Scott radioed his sergeant for permission to make physical contact with 
Harris’s vehicle in what is termed a “PIT” (precise intervention technique) 
maneuver. A PIT maneuver is a driving technique designed to stop a fleeing 
motorist safely and quickly by hitting the fleeing car at a specific point which 
throws the car into a spin the driver cannot control, bringing the car to a stop. 
Neither Scott nor the sergeant knew why the chase had been initiated, but 
Scott wanted to end the chase as soon as possible because he felt that Harris 
was acting in a reckless and dangerous manner. At the time of Scott’s request, 
there were no motorists or pedestrians in the area because of the decision to 
blockade intersections.
In granting Scott permission to make contact with Harris’s vehicle, the 
sergeant stated over the radio, “Go ahead and take him out. Take him out.” 
Scott determined that he could not perform the PIT maneuver because he 
was going too fast. Instead, he decided to ram Harris’s rear bumper. As a 
result, Harris lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an 
embankment, and crashed. Harris was rendered a quadriplegic. No one else 
was injured.
Under the vehicle pursuit policy of the Sheriff’s Office in effect at the time of 
the incident, decisions regarding the initiation, continuation, and termination 
of pursuits were left to the discretion of the officer and supervisor in the field. 
The policy cautioned, however, that an officer should discontinue the pursuit 
when “upon weighing the pertinent factors, the gravity of the offense and the 
prospect of losing the suspect will not balance with the hazards to the Deputy 
and the public” or “upon receipt of additional information once the pursuit 
has begun that would allow later apprehension and successful prosecution.” 
Most police departments across the country had such a policy in force at the 
time of the incident.
Additionally, the policy stated that “the pursuing deputy should keep in 
mind his personal safety and try everything within his authority to apprehend 
the violator without resorting to a high-speed chase.” The Sheriff’s Office 
admitted that officers did not receive training on these policies, including the 
pursuit policy, nor were they trained to determine whether to make contact 
with fleeing vehicles or in how to make such contact safely.
In October 2001, Harris sued Scott for violating his Fourth Amendment 
rights to reasonable seizures by using excessive force to stop his vehicle. Scott 
moved for summary judgment on Harris’s Fourth Amendment claim that 
he was subjected to an unreasonable seizure because of Scott’s use of excessive 
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force. Under established precedent it is clear that a seizure occurred when 
Scott rammed Harris’s vehicle.
Claims of excessive force are subject to an objective reasonableness inquiry 
established in Graham v. Connor in 1989. Under Graham, 
the question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in 
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 
underlying intent or motivation . . . . The “reasonableness” of a particular 
use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on 
the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . . The calculus 
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary 
in a particular situation.10 
Graham instructs that the trier of fact must examine the facts carefully and 
provides three examples of questions relevant to the inquiry: (1) how severe 
was the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to 
the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether he was attempting to evade 
arrest by flight.11 
In support of his motion, Scott contended that there was no factual dispute 
about whether there was a constitutional violation because his use of force 
was objectively reasonable given that Harris was driving recklessly at high 
speeds and had hit Scott’s vehicle. In opposing the motion, Harris argued that 
ramming his vehicle was unreasonable because Scott used excessive force to 
stop Harris, who was merely a traffic offender, and because the officers could 
have used alternative means to arrest him at a later time.
How should the Court rule on the motion for summary judgment?
Class Discussion
A classroom discussion of this scenario may be structured in many ways 
based on one’s pedagogical goals.12 My goals are twofold: to help my students 
understand how to apply the summary judgment standard in a fact-specific 
context, and to teach them how to read images critically. I focus here on the 
second goal.
10. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
11. Id. at 396.
12. My colleague Philip Schrag uses his own version of this exercise that is entirely interactive. 
He has groups of students argue for Scott and Harris and then vote on summary judgment 
without the video. After showing the video, he has them vote again. Then he gradually 
reveals what happened in the actual case, providing excerpts from the district court, the 
Supreme Court majority, and the Supreme Court dissent. Last, he provides the students 
with an excerpt from Jessica Silbey’s article about studies of filmed confessions and asks the 
students to vote one last time. See Jessica M. Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House and the Genre 
of Documentary Film, 29 ColuM. J.l. & aRts 107, 162-63 (2005).
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As a way for the students to increase their comfort with the summary 
judgment standard, as well as with the law and the facts described in the 
exercise, I begin the class by asking them first to articulate the best arguments 
for granting summary judgment and then to articulate the best arguments for 
denying summary judgment. I poll the class on how they would rule if they 
were the district court judge. 
Then I tell the students to assume that as part of his evidence on the summary 
judgment motion, Scott includes the videos taken from the dashcams of the 
two police cars that pursued Harris, first Reynolds’s and then Scott’s once he 
took over the lead. I warn them that in the video they will see the crash that 
ended the chase. I show enough of the video that they get a sense of both the 
dullness and the drama, making sure to include the detour into the parking lot 
where Scott takes over the pursuit.
I ask my students if the video changed anyone’s mind about whether to 
grant or deny the motion for summary judgment, and I follow up with the 
whole class about why it might. I lecture briefly about film and visual literacy 
to provide students with a basic vocabulary for interpreting and interrogating 
visual images.13 I try to impress upon them that this is now an important tool 
for lawyers, and especially litigators, as images and film have come to play a 
key role in legal proof and persuasion. Without a critical visual vocabulary, I 
suggest, they will be more likely to “forget that cameras frame the images they 
capture and render unseen those things outside the frame; that they always 
situate the viewer relative to the image; that film and video narrate as well as 
depict; and that images have different meanings in different contexts to people 
with different ways of seeing.”14
We discuss how videos, like eyewitnesses, have one dominant perspective, 
and that it is important to ask how the medium, the viewing context, and the 
audience might inform (or distort) our perception. I guide them in thinking 
about how they might assess film and video; they often suggest considering the 
position of the camera, the angle, the way the images are framed, selected, and 
edited. If I have laid the foundation properly, the students see that the very 
techniques they are suggesting create opportunities for alternative narratives 
of images and enhance their abilities as lawyers. 
At this point I turn to the majority opinion in Scott v. Harris,15 and the 
students are primed to see the visual naiveté of the Scott majority. They can 
identify how eight Justices failed to differentiate between the chase itself, the 
13. I primarily use my article The Image Cannot Speak for Itself, but also incorporate the foundational 
ideas of Jessica Silbey and Jennifer Mnookin. See Naomi Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for 
Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and Visual Literacy, 48 val. u. l. Rev. 1 (2013). Much of the 
discussion that follows comes from ideas in that article.
14. Mezey, supra note 13, at 13.
15. Seven justices joined Scalia’s opinion for the Court reversing the lower courts and concluding 
that Officer Scott acted reasonably in terminating the chase and was entitled to summary 
judgment. 550 U.S. at 380-81. Ginsburg and Breyer also wrote concurring opinions. Id. at 
386-87. Stevens was the lone dissenter. Id. at 389.
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different testimonial narratives of the chase, and the video of the chase. It 
is now striking to them that the Justices “were not only convinced that the 
video had a ready-made meaning entirely apart from their own perceptions—
that it spoke for itself—but that this indisputable meaning so thoroughly 
contradicted all competing facts in the record that they could decide the 
summary judgment question themselves.”16 Most students see how odd it is 
in the context of summary judgment for the video to operate “as a meta-fact 
through which all other facts should be viewed and evaluated rather than as 
yet another piece of evidence subject to competing interpretations.”17
I ask them to consider how they might have critically engaged and reoriented 
the possible meaning of the dashcam video if they had been Harris’s lawyer. 
Someone will mention that the video, shot from the squad car, places the 
viewer in the position of law enforcement. I supplement this insight by asking 
them to imagine how different the scene might have looked in a video taken 
from the back of Harris’s car, from the side of the road, or from a helicopter. 
Often a student will think about the framing of the video, appreciating that 
the dashcam technology limits the field of vision, introduces distortions, and 
makes some things in the periphery invisible. They will usually identify that 
the lack of color, the confusing lights, and the sounds of the police radio all 
influence our perception. 
The question remains, will more sophisticated analysis of visual evidence 
change how judges and juries view it? Empirical work done by Dan Kahan, 
David Hoffman, and Donald Braman suggests that it might.18 These scholars 
accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to the public to “see for themselves” 
that the Scott video was conclusive. Kahan and his coauthors showed the Scott 
v. Harris video to a diverse group of 1350 Americans. They found significant 
differences in factual perception based on group identity and underlying 
cultural and ideological values. These findings indicate that lawyers can help 
translate visual evidence to juries and judges in ways that minimize and make 
visible the cognitive biases that otherwise limit their reading of the image. 
I conclude our classroom work on visuality by integrating that discussion 
with the earlier doctrinal question of factual disputes at summary judgment 
and the difficulties posed by the protean nature of facts. We return to the 
material facts we had identified in discussing the reasonableness of the seizure: 
whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 
the public. The important question is whether the video provides conclusive 
evidence of those facts, and the class is usually split on this question. If they 
are split, wouldn’t it be likely that a jury would be as well? And if a jury would 
be split, isn’t that precisely when a factual dispute is genuine and not ripe for 
summary judgment? I’m curious whether they think that facts embodied in 
16. Id. at 26.
17. Id.
18. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott 
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 haRv. l. Rev. 837 (2009).
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visual evidence are more likely to seem material. I ask because I suspect that 
this was partly what was going on in Scott—that the majority assumed it showed 
them exactly what they were looking for. Yet for all the video did show—and it 
could well be potentially probative on many issues—it is less than conclusive 
on how necessary and dangerous the chase was and, therefore, on whether 
Officer Scott’s actions were reasonable.19
In addition to allowing me to introduce my students to the complexity and 
richness of summary judgment determinations, to the ambiguous role of facts 
in relation to law, and to a set of critical tools for reading images, Scott v. Harris 
also allows my students to see the violence of the law. They read about and 
see the violent encounter between the Georgia police and Victor Harris. The 
exercise, however, makes them aware of the normative violence of the Supreme 
Court’s reading and resolution of that encounter in a way that would be less 
accessible to them without it.20
19. Mezey, supra note 13, at 27.
20. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 yale l.J. 1601 (1986).
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